(Originally posted on 01/16/2009)
By Anu Saha
They say that no news from Africa is good news. Last year, Zimbabwe’s reserve bank issued a 100 billion Zimbabwean Dollar (Z$) note. In a market with the world’s highest inflation rates, peaking at suicidal percentage points, and persistently chronic food shortages caused by the disastrous economic policies of the maniacal Mugabe, chances are that this note will soon be, or already has been, discarded on the streets of Harare, worthless even to street vendors. When it was issued, Z$100 billion could only purchase three eggs. It was just another note in a long string of many, heavy with zeros but weightless in value, a manifestation of the country’s useless currency and crippled reserves.
The peculiar tragedy of Zimbabwe’s fall to billion dollar notes is that the country was once a beacon of hope for the continent, particularly in the sub-Saharan region. Africa’s story, for many in the international community, is garnered largely from the 7 o clock news, through two minute snippets depicting droughts, famine, AIDS, war and genocide. Over the last couple of years, Zimbabwe has become a victim of this trend, and has visited our television screens in the same way. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, it was not Zimbabwe, but countries such as Rwanda, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, and Mozambique that were synonymous with conflict in Africa. During South Africa’s struggle against Apartheid, Zimbabwe provided refuge to both black and white activists who escaped political imprisonment or were in exile. During those years, when rallies and violence in Soweto captured the world’s attention, Zimbabwe remained relatively peaceful, even though it was, like many of its neighbors, a young country (having gained independence from British rule only in 1980).
Peace certainly did not mean that Zimbabwe did not have problems, but these were symptomatic of the types of chronic challenges that are faced by many developing countries. Politics were dominated by Mugabe since 1987. There were widespread international condemnations and accusations of rigging, corruption, and suppression of opposition leaders during elections. Economic reforms trickled, and efforts to transition to a market-driven economy failed. But, in spite of these failings, the country managed to maintain positive economics growth in the 1980s and early 1990s, primarily owing to mining of its vast mineral resources, tourism, and yes, agriculture. Zimbabwe only a decade ago, was a net exporter of maize (or corn). Today, not only is the country unable to produce enough maize for domestic consumption, it is not even able to pay for sufficient quantities of imported maize to feed its citizens.
Gross malfeasance and mismanagement by Zimbabwe’s Government are the root causes for this crisis. Added to these was the controversial land distribution of 2000, when vast tracts of agricultural land, owned by white farmers, who had lived in Zimbabwe for generations, were forcibly seized. Ultimately, the majority of Zimbabwe’s white population was forced to leave the country. This was all orchestrated using the old yet disastrously effective “colonial guilt” rhetoric, which went something like this: A vast majority (allegedly 70 percent) of the country’s arable land was owned by its minority white population who inherited that land from their colonizing ancestors. Land was, supposedly on these grounds, forcibly distributed to blacks by the government. The process so far appears to have primarily benefited government loyalists, not black Zimbabweans as was promised. The compulsory removal of the white farming population caused a brain drain that eventually sent shock waves through the economy as agricultural output plummeted.
The process by which the land distribution was carried out serves as an example of the expediency with which disastrous decisions end up aggravating, instead of curing, the social ills they are purported to fix. Land inequalities probably did exist before 2000, as the government alleged, and these inequalities were indeed probably partly as a result of British colonial rule. However, the government’s tactic of blaming whites, many of whom had lived in Zimbabwe for generations, is hollow and dangerous. Land inequalities could have been addressed through a variety of other policies during the over 20 years of Mugabe’s rule. Revenue from the agricultural sector, which the government chastised for being dominated by whites, could have been directed to investment in the country’s abundant mineral wealth and to education and training for blacks in this sector. The same approach could have been taken for other industries, such as healthcare, small businesses, education and tourism. In the agricultural sector, the implementation of labor laws to address discrimination and subsidies to provide on the job training for black farm workers could have, albeit gradually, diversified the workforce and redressed socio-economic inequalities. These are easier said than done, and there certainly are disadvantages associated with each that are not discussed here. But, more importantly, neither were they discussed (or even considered for that matter) by Zimbabwe’s government. What was chosen instead was a policy driven by blame and by picking on the wounds of history. It is perhaps because of this that it utterly failed.
The BBC recently ran a story on a speech Mugabe gave at a rally, during which he chillingly declared, “Zimbabwe is mine.” As I watched him, I didn’t see a statesman, nor did I see an autocrat, or even a fascist dictator. What I did see was an old man, once a hero, now drunk and delusional with power, who lies to his people because he is too fearful to face the reality that the people of Zimbabwe, who once loved him, no longer consider him relevant. I realized how wrong he was. Zimbabwe is not his. Sadly, although he does not appear to realize it, it never was.
Filed under: Alternate Progress , Anu, Colonial History, Government, Zimbabwe
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